Last week, Atalayar, a media outlet close to the Moroccan government, insisted on stirring up the atmosphere ahead of the High-Level Meeting (HLM) between Spain and Morocco, to be held on the 4th and 5th of this week, by revealing some of the strategic objectives being considered by the Alawite negotiators. Ignacio Cembrero, a journalist and writer specializing in the Maghreb, has laid bare all of this in recent days. According to the official Moroccan narrative, the two countries now form a stable partnership based on high-level political cooperation, record trade—around €22.700 billion annually—cooperation in investment, infrastructure, energy, transport, and technology, and also collaboration in security, migration, and the fight against terrorism, areas in which Morocco is considered a key partner. There is no doubt that Morocco has consolidated its position as Spain's leading trading partner outside the EU and as Spain's main customer and supplier in Africa. For Spanish companies, it is a nearby, competitive, and cost-effective market; For Morocco, Spain is a privileged gateway to the EU.
For Atalayar, this is a pragmatic, win-win relationship: Spain secures border stability, predictable trade, and opportunities for its companies, while Morocco gains investment, implicit recognition of its growing regional influence, and support for its major economic projects. This narrative, however, overlooks the main point of contention: the asymmetrical impact of these agreements on a territory like the Canary Islands, which are being used as bargaining chips. Although the "win-win" framework—where all parties involved seek and achieve mutual benefit—is valid at the macroeconomic level, the situation in the Canary Islands is different. Due to its proximity to Morocco and its strategic position in the Atlantic, the archipelago is the Spanish territory most likely to be affected and sacrificed by bilateral agreements on crucial issues.
Maritime delimitation is a conflict that intensifies every time negotiations of this kind attempt to move forward. Morocco repeatedly and unilaterally claims maritime zones that overlap with areas near the Canary Islands, affecting historical fishing grounds, strategic underwater resources (tellurium, cobalt, and rare earth elements), and control of the Atlantic. This long-standing Moroccan claim, if successful, would cause profound economic, ecological, and strategic damage.
Morocco argues that its extensive continental coastline deserves "equitable" treatment compared to the "limited" coastline of the Canary Islands. This rhetoric, however, is deeply misleading. It distorts the Statute of the Canary Islands because the archipelago is not an uninhabited rock. It is a Spanish autonomous community with over 2,2 million European citizens, whose economy and livelihoods depend directly on the sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not distinguish between "continental coast" and "island coast" when establishing maritime rights. To claim otherwise is an attempt to create a second-class status for island territories. Equidistance is indeed fairness: the median line is not a blind "automatic" rule, but rather the most objective and widely accepted starting point for a just delimitation. Systematically adjusting it in favor of the party with the longer coastline is not fairness; it is the law of the strongest disguised as law.
And a potentially dangerous “equivalence” is being suggested. Morocco would offer Spain “recognition of Spanish sovereignty over the Canary Islands” if Spain recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. As various diplomatic analyses point out, this is a highly troubling move. The Canary Islands are internationally recognized Spanish territory—beyond legal dispute—and therefore, introducing them into negotiations means placing them on the same level as a disputed territory, which sets a very dangerous political precedent. The sovereignty of the archipelago should not be a bargaining chip. It is unacceptable, and we cannot allow it.
The proposal for a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) around Mount Tropic sounds good in theory, but in practice it's a trap for the Canary Islands. Establishing a JDZ in an area that, due to its geology and proximity, should correspond to the extended continental shelf of the Canary Islands, legitimizes Morocco's claim to that space. It's conceding before even negotiating. In any joint venture, Morocco, as a continental state with strong political backing, would have an overwhelming position of power against Canarian interests. History shows that in these kinds of arrangements, the weaker party usually loses out.
Morocco's attempt to extend its continental shelf up to 350 miles north of the Canary Islands is the most aggressive move. It is a direct attack on our future. If successful, it would turn our islands into a maritime prison—surrounded by Moroccan waters to the east and south—with severely restricted access to the Atlantic. It strangles our potential EEZ—limiting our access to future fishing, mineral, and genetic resources—compromises our maritime security and surveillance capabilities, and threatens vital projects such as submarine cable connectivity with West Africa.
Surprisingly, the management of airspace over the Sahara is presented as a mere technical matter. It is not. It is a matter of sovereignty and security for Spain and the Canary Islands. The Gran Canaria Control Center is a critical infrastructure that guarantees the safety of one of the busiest air routes in the world. Transferring its management to Morocco, even "gradually," weakens the strategic position of Spain and NATO on the southern flank, introduces an unnecessary geopolitical risk to a vital infrastructure, and ignores the proven technical effectiveness of the current service.
Morocco's grandiose "Atlantic Vision" does not include the Canary Islands as a partner, but rather as an obstacle to overcome or a prize to be acquired. For Rabat, the agreement with Spain is not an end in itself, but a step toward its ultimate strategic objective: to weaken the Canary Islands' ties with Spain and Europe and increase its influence over the archipelago.
All of this highlights a serious territorial asymmetry within Spain. While the peninsula can benefit from trade and investment, the Canary Islands remain on the economic periphery, in a worrying geopolitical position, and with less capacity to influence Spanish foreign policy.
The bilateral decisions made in Madrid directly impact the Canary Islands, which are marginalized and prevented from actively participating in the negotiations. Once again, this region is left in a state of uncertainty, given the passivity of the Canary Islands Government. The discourse of a “win-win agreement” between Spain and Morocco is based on real economic and diplomatic data: record trade, strengthened cooperation, and political stability. However, it masks a clear asymmetry: what benefits the country as a whole does not necessarily benefit—and may even harm—territories like the Canary Islands, whose geographical position makes them a border, a platform, and a critical point.
The Canary Islands cannot be a secondary player in this process: they are the Spanish territory most affected by maritime delimitation, strategic resources, and Atlantic geopolitics. The key to the future will be whether Spain integrates the archipelago into decision-making and unequivocally protects its interests—or whether, on the contrary, it allows the “win-win” scenario to become a “win for some, risk for others.” Cooperation with Morocco must be absolutely respectful of the Canary Islands and ensure complete legal certainty. Spain must firmly defend its maritime median, preventing Morocco from unilaterally expanding its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It cannot back down on establishing bilateral mechanisms for the control and protection of resources. And it must guarantee that the Canary Islands benefit from increased trade and energy and technology investments, and that the archipelago consolidates its position as a logistics hub between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. A true win-win situation must be achieved for the Canary Islands as well.
Furthermore, the Sahrawi dimension adds another layer of complexity that cannot be ignored in any way, despite the recent decisions of Pedro Sánchez's government. If Western Sahara continues to be internationally recognized as a distinct territory awaiting decolonization, maritime boundaries must be handled with extreme care, as any redefinition by Morocco—or in alliance with Spain—would violate recognized rights. The disputed maritime and submarine resources in the Atlantic—around the Canary Islands, Western Sahara, and Moroccan waters—become not only an economic interest but also an international legal issue. Therefore, defending the interests of the Canary Islands cannot be separated from defending the rights of the Sahrawi people. It is therefore necessary to demand legality, respect for international law, and consistency between diplomacy, trade, and justice.
Western Sahara is not a negotiable variable outside the bounds of the law. It is a matter of rights, sovereignty, and international justice. This must include recognizing the Sahrawi people's right to decide their future, requiring their consent for any agreement that affects them, and clearly excluding Western Sahara from treaties that bind the EU to Morocco. Otherwise, what is proclaimed as "strategic cooperation" could end up being a fragile construct—profitable for some, illegal for others—and morally unsustainable. And in this balance between geopolitics, economics, and international law, not only the future of Western Sahara is at stake, but also the credibility of the EU, Spain, Morocco, and all of us who demand justice.
